

Economic Sanctions

Yale University, Spring 2013

Wed 3:30-5:20 pm in Room RKZ 02

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Office Hours: Tuesday 3 pm - 4:30 pm

- **Course Description:** This is a course on a subject that is of great practical interest. The main question of interest is: do economic sanctions work? We will hear what critics and proponents have to say and will try to adjudicate the debate. We will look at illustrations of how sanctions are used, and of what they achieve. We will discuss the ethical and practical questions that arise when choosing to use sanctions, and the merits of alternative policies such as doing nothing or applying military force. We will review a set of cases: do sanctions ever bring democracy (Myanmar)? Do sanctions tame nuclear ambitions (Iran)? Do sanctions help deal with civil wars (Syria)?

Reading will be 80-100 pages a week, generally, with the final, shortened reading list to be determined by first day of class.

- **Who can take this class?**

Everyone who comes to first meeting of class has a chance to enroll: all decisions are typically made the same day. There are no prerequisites as such.

- **Requirements and Grading:**

Grades for the course will be based on participation (20%), debates (30 %), midterm examination (20 %) and a final examination (30 %). Participation consists of class attendance, completion of the readings, active participation in discussion.

There will be one short essay-style take-home midterm (3-5 pages, due week 7), and one-take home final examination that students complete on their own within a 'window of opportunity' set me within the limits of finals week (5-7 pages).

There will be three debates: one on our fourth meeting (Did sanctions help Myanmar democratize?), one on our eighth meeting (Do sanctions help against Iranian nukes?), one on our twelfth meeting (Would sanctions help deal with the Syrian crisis?). No debating skills necessary: these are presentations on policy, and include reviewing research and arguments.

Depending on enrollment, students can expect to be part of 1 or 2 debating teams. We will determine the groups together (who you are with) and ‘sides’, making sure that each debating group is between two and four people. Each debating session will consist of one side making the case for sanctions in a certain case and the other side making the case against, plus time for rebuttals and discussion.

Students who present as part of debating team will produce collectively a presentation. Students who are not presenting as part of team will produce a policy memo of 2-3 pages for each debate: taking one or the other side and justifying their position.

Good sources to consult on sanctions: Foreign Policy (FP) is a great resource, we will always start the class by discussing any news they have on [sanctions](#). Another good source is the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), they often discuss [sanctions](#). Also good: [The Economist](#), and just about any other major news organization (search keyword “sanctions” to check out their coverage).

Course Outline and Syllabus

Week 1

Introducing Economic Statecraft

The Megarian Decree, [link](#)

Dianne Rennack and Robert Shuey. Economic sanctions to achieve u.s. foreign policy goals: Discussion and guide to current law. Congressional Research Service Report, October 1997, [link](#)

[“A User’s Guide To Economic Sanctions”](#) by Robert P. O’Quinn of the Heritage Foundation

Week 2

The Origins of Bargaining Leverage

James Rosenau. *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems*. Free Press, New York, 1969, pp. 1-17.

David Baldwin. *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton University, Princeton, 1985, up to p 69.

Excerpts from Clausewitz, On War.

Thomas Schelling. *Arms and Influence*. Yale University, New Haven, 1966. Written under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, pp. 1-34.

Albert Hirschman. *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. University of California, Berkeley, California, 1969, pp. 3-52.

Week 3

Sanctions and Democratization

Johan Galtung. On the effects of international economic sanctions with examples from the case of rhodesia. *World Politics*, 19(3):378–416, 1967

Philip Levy. Sanctions on south africa: What did they do? *American Economic Review*, 89(2):415–420, 1999

Abel Escribà-Folch. Authoritarian responses to foreign pressure: Spending, repression, and sanctions. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45:683–713, 2012

Christian Von Soest and Michael Wahman. Sanctions and democratization in the post-cold war era. Mimeo, SSRN, 2012, available at [SSRN](#).

OPTIONAL [Curse or Cure? China, Africa, and the Effects of Unconditioned Wealth](#) by Patrick J. Keenan, University of Illinois-College of Law.

Week 4

Class Debate: Did Sanctions Bring Democracy to Burma?

[“A Burmese spring?”](#) *Economist*, October 8, 2011

[My Obligatory Post On Iran Sanctions](#) by Daniel Drezner

Daniel W. Drezner. Bad debts: Assessing china's financial influence in great power politics. *International Security*, 49:1–35, 2009

Week 5

When Do Sanctions Succeed? Attempts to Learn from Many Cases

HSE's Landmark Study ...

G. Hufbauer, J. Schott, K. Elliott, and B. Oegg. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. Washington: The Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007, [Chapters 1 and 2](#).

G. Hufbauer, J. Schott, K. Elliott, and B. Oegg. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. Washington: The Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007, [Chapters 3 and 4](#).

G. Hufbauer, J. Schott, K. Elliott, and B. Oegg. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. Washington: The Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007, [Chapter 6 and Appendix A](#). Appendix A best understood with some background in stats. It's ok, but plan on taking some stats while at Yale (!)

Robert Pape. Why economic sanctions do not work. *International Security*, 22(2):90–136, 1997

Richard Farmer. Costs of economic sanctions to the sender. *World Economy*, pages 93–117, 2000

Week 6

The Costs and Ethics of Sanctions

Richard Garfield. 1999. [Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children from 1990 Through 1998](#). Columbia University.

P. S. Meilinger. A matter of precision - why air power may be more humane than sanctions. *Foreign Policy*, pages 78–79, 2001

[Were Sanctions Right?](#) By DAVID RIEFF in the *New York Times*, July 27, 2003

Susan Hannah Allen. The domestic political costs of economic sanctions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52:916–944, 2008

Ruth Grant. Ethics and incentives: A political approach. *American Political Science Review*, 100:29–39, 1 2006

Shmuel Nili, Sanctions on Non-Democracies (classesv2 Resources)

Week 7

Rachel Loeffler, “Bank Shots: How the Financial System Can Isolate Regimes”, *Foreign Affairs* 88 (March/April 2009): 101-110

Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism. By Meghan L. O’Sullivan. Brookings Institution Press, 2003. Pp [Part on Iran]

Daniel Drezner. Conflict expectations and the paradox of economic coercion. *International Studies Quarterly*, 42:709–731, 1998

A. Cooper Drury and Yitan Li. Us economic sanction threats against china: Failing to leverage better human rights. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2(4):307–324, 2006

PBS Movie Showing *Red Line*

Week 8

Class Debate: Are Sanctions a Good Policy Against Iran?

“Israeli Foreign Ministry Calls for More Sanctions on Iran” by ISABEL KERSHNER *New York Times*, September 27, 2012

The Sanctions Conundrum by Peter Passell, *Foreign Policy*, October 9, 2012.

Week 9

Cooperation and its Importance for Sanctions

Lisa Martin. Institutions and cooperation: Sanctions during the falkland islands conflict. *International Security*, 16:143–178, 1992

Lisa L. Martin. Credibility, costs, and institutions: Cooperation on economic sanctions. *World Politics*, 45:406–432, 1993

Daniel Drezner. Bargaining, enforcement, and multilateral sanctions: When is cooperation counterproductive? *International Organization*, 54(1):73–102, Winter 2000

David Baldwin. The sanctions debate and the logic of choice. *International Security*, 24(3):80–107, 1999

Week 10

Human Rights, Political Regimes, and Economic Sanctions

A Magnitsky law for Europe: The US statute is a pro-Russian, not anti-Russian, act, FT, January 2, 2013.

Kim Richard Nossal. International sanctions as international punishment. *International Organization*, 43(2):301–22, 1989

Nicholas Kristoff, Op-Ed in New York Times. *Our Man in Havana*. November 8, 2003. Available from class website.

Risa Brooks. Sanctions and regime type: What works, and when. *Security Studies*, 11:1–50, 2002

Nikolay Marinov. Do economic sanctions destabilize country leaders? *American Journal of Political Science*, 49:564–576, 2005

Abel Escriba-Folch and Joseph Wright. Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(2):335–359, JUN 2010

Week 11

Conflict and its Aftermath A Place for Sanctions?

Peter Andreas. Criminalizing consequences of sanctions. *International Studies Quarterly*, 49:335–60, 2005

Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull. Are smart sanctions feasible? *World Politics*, 54:373–403, 2002

Cosgrove, Erica, Are Travel Bans Effective in Wallensteen and Staibano, *International Sanctions*

G. Hufbauer, J. Schott, K. Elliott, and B. Oegg. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. Washington: The Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007, Chapter 5, available as a [Yale internet resource](#).

Week 12

Class Debate: Will Sanctions Help in the Syrian Crisis?

[“U.S. Accuses Hezbollah of Aiding Syria’s Crackdown”](#) by By RICK GLADSTONE and ANNE BARNARD *New York Times*, August 10, 2012.

[The Sanctions Program SPITS](#): Resources on smart sanctions from Uppsala Universitaet.

Week 13

The Future of Power Politics and Economic Sanctions

S.M. Walt. The relationship between theory and policy in international relations. *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, 8:23–48, 2005

Judith Kelley and Beth Simmons. From scrutiny to shame: Social pressure in us anti-human trafficking policy. Mimeo, Duke University and Harvard University, 2012

Christopher Ross. Public diplomacy comes of age. *The Washington Quarterly*, 25:75–83, 2002

Timothy M. Peterson. Sending a message: The reputation effect of us sanction threat behavior¹. *International Studies Quarterly*, pages no–no, 2012

Benjamin E. Goldsmith and Yusaku Horiuchi. Spinning the globe? u.s. public diplomacy and foreign public opinion. *The Journal of Politics*, 71:863–875, 6 2009

Joseph Nye, [“The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective”](#), *Foreign Affairs* 88 (Nov/Dec 2010)