

International Institutions

Spring 2013

Mondays 3.30 - 5.20 pm in RKZ 102

Nikolay Marinov

Office: Rosenkranz Hall 407

Office Hours: Tuesday 3 pm - 4:30 pm

- **Course Description:**

International relations are often said to be in a state of ‘anarchy’, understood as a state or system in which no central authority exists to enforce contracts and implement order. The question we will pose is: how can order, cooperation, and peace emerge under conditions of anarchy? We start the course by asking theoretical questions about the emergence of cooperation under anarchy. We continue by probing fundamental questions about the effects of institutions (formal and informal) on behavior, the construction of institutions, the durability and form of international organizations.

- **Who can take this class?**

Everyone who comes to first meeting of class has a chance to enroll: all decisions are typically made the same day. There are no prerequisites as such.

- **Requirements and Grading:**

Grades for the course will be based on participation (30%), presentation on international institution (30 %), midterm examination (20 %) and a final examination (30 %). Participation consists of class attendance, completion of the readings, active participation in discussion.

There will be one short essay-style take-home midterm (3-5 pages, due week 7), and one-take home final examination that students complete on their own within a ‘window of opportunity’ set me within the limits of finals week (5-7 pages).

Each student will prepare a presentation about an issue area or institution they feel passionate about or are genuinely interested in, and should send me a written proposals of up to three different ideas before our third meeting. I will work with you in picking

one institution for you to focus on from your list with ideas. Beginning with week eight, we will hold presentations, in which the student will tell us about the institution and take questions from the audience. Presentation length will be announced, and will depend on class size: generally, between 15 and 30 minutes will be expected. In some cases, I may allow more than one student to work on the same presentation/institution.

Week 1

What Is the Problem of International Cooperation?

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 1-32 - in ed. Robert Stressler. *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*. Touchstone, New York, 1998

Hobbes, Leviathan (the blue Cambridge edition - find it online as a free Google book), pp. 86-200.

Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action, chapters 1 and 2, pp. 1-65.

Week 2

Chaos, Order, Authority and Efficiency in International Relations: Insights from History and Microeconomics

George Akerlof. The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 3:488-500, 1970

Ronald H. Coase. The problem of social cost. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 3:1-44, 1960

Steven Krasner. Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables. In Stephen Krasner, editor, *International Regimes*, pages 1-22. Cornell, Ithaca, NY, 1983

Week 3

How Does Cooperation Emerge? The Causal Mechanisms

R. H. Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law (Chicago, 1990), Chapters. 1 and 2, pp. 1-56.

Robert Axelrod. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. Basic Books, New York, 1984, pp. 1-54.

Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal. Why states act through formal international organizations. In Paul Diehl and Brian Frederking, editors, *The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World*. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 2010

Week 4

International Institutions: Perspectives on Effectiveness

J. Mearsheimer. The false promise of international institutions. *International Security*, 19:5–49, 1995

George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom. Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? *International Organization*, 50(3):379–406, 1996

James Fearon. Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science. *World Politics*, 43(2):169–195, 1991

Erik Voeten. Do nationals in leadership positions affect cooperation with international organizations? evidence from the international criminal court using a regression discontinuity design. Mimeo, Georgetown University, 2010

Week 5

Principals or Agents? Delegating Power and Regime Design

Robert D. Putnam. Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. *International Organization*, 42(3):427–460, 1988

Ronald B. Mitchell. Regime design matters: Intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance. *International Organization*, 48(3):425–458, 1994

Darren Hawkins, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney. Delegation under anarchy: States, international organizations, and principal agent theory. In Darren Hawkins, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney, editors, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, pages 3–38. Cambridge, New York, NY, 2006

Mark Pollack. Delegation and discretion in the european union. In Darren Hawkins, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney, editors, *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge, New York, NY, 2006

“Is There a Depth versus Participation Dilemma in International Cooperation?” by Thomas Bernauer, Anna Kalbhenn, Vally Koubi, Gabriele Spilker, ETH Zurich

Week 6

The Global Trade Regime and Cooperation in Financial Affairs

FUN: [Charlemagne: Summit for one](#) in *Economist*, January 7, 2012.

James Vreeland. *The IMF and Economic Development*. Cambridge, New York, 2003 (excerpts)

Keisuke Iida. Is wto dispute settlement effective. In Paul Diehl and Brian Frederking, editors, *The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World*. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 2010

Lawrence Broz and Michael Hawes. Us domestic politics and international monetary fund policy. In Darren Hawkins, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney, editors, *Delegation and agency in international organizations*, pages 42–76. Cambridge, New York, NY, 2006

Easterly, William [The Cartel of Good Intentions](#) - criticism of foreign aid.

Week 7

The UN System, Multilateralism and International Law

Erik Voeten. The political origins of the un security council’s ability to legitimize the use of force. *International Organization*, 59(3):527–557, 2005

Ian Hurd. Myths of membership: The politics of legitimation in un security council reform. In Paul Diehl and Brian Frederking, editors, *The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World*. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 2010

Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Agreements by Yonatan Lupu, GWU.

Week 8

The Environment

FUN: **Lost property: The world's fisheries are in an even worse state than feared**, in *The Economist*, Feb 25 2012

FUN: **How Scientists Came to Love the Whale**, *NYT*, Jan 6, 2012.

FUN: *Washington Post*, Jan 11, 2012: **Researchers propose putting a price on whales**. Related, discussion in NYT **"Have we saved the whales?"**

FUN: **A Profitable Rainforest** in *Economist*, May 18, 2009.

Peter Haas. Banning chlorofluorocarbons: epistemic community efforts to protect stratospheric ozone. *International Organization*, 46(1):187–224, 1992

Kal Raustiala. States, ngos, and international environmental institutions. *International Studies Quarterly*, 4:719–740, 1997

Alexander Thompson. Efficiency, distribution and the soft law future of the climate regime. International Policymaking and Agreements Conference, Yale University, April 8-9, 2011, 2011. Conference Paper

"Building State Capacity for Environmental Protection? Lessons from an Environmental Politics Model for Authoritarian States" by Xun Cao and Hugh Ward, Department of Government, University of Essex.

Week 9

Cooperation in Human Rights

FUN: **A Tigress and Her Tormentors**, October 8, 2011.

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Relations*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1998, Chapters 1 and 3.

Oona Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?,” 111 Yale Law Journal 1935 (2002).

Christopher Rudolph. Constructing an atrocities regime: The politics of war crimes tribunals. *International Organization*, 55(3):655–691, 2001

James Vreeland. Cat selection: Why dictatorships enter into the united nations convention against torture. *International Organization*, 2007

John Hagan and Sanja Ivković. Structural preconditionality, smoking gun evidence and collective command responsibility for war crimes in former yugoslavia. Chicago, IL, April 2009. Midwest Political Science Association. Conference Paper

MOVIE SHOWING ON ICC (date and time TBA) *Prosecutor*

Week 10

Weak States, Peace-Keeping

FUN: [Cozy Club or Sword of Righeousness?](#) in *Economist*, October 8, 2011.

Michael Barnett. *Eyewitness to a Genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda*. Cornell, Ithaca, NY, 2003, pp.96-192

James Fearon and David Laitin. Neotrusteeship and the problem of weak states. *International Security*, 28:5–43, 2004

Daniel Corstange and Molly Inman. Can security council resolutions disarm militias? evidence from a survey experiment in lebanon. 2012

Week 11

Institutions for Ending Wars

Page Fortna Chapter 1 and 5

Barbara Walter. Designing transitions from civil war: Demobilization, democratization, and commitments to peace. *International Security*, 24:127–155, 2012

James Fearon [Testimony to Congress on Iraq](#), go to 2 hrs 16 min to 2 hrs 23 min section of clip

Karen Alter. Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power. In Darren Hawkins, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney, editors, *Delegation and agency in international organizations*, pages 312–338. Cambridge, New York, NY, 2006

Week 12

Sovereignty and Security

Stephen Krasner. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1999, excerpts.

Mark Zacher. The territorial integrity norm: International boundaries and the use of force. *International Organization*, 55(2):215–250, 2001

David Lake. Escape from the state of nature: Authority and hierarchy in world politics. *International Security*, 32:47–79, 2007

G. John Ikenberry. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, Princeton, NJ, 2001, pp. 1-51.

Week 13

Socialization, Norms, Bureaucracies

Yonatan Lupu and Erik Voeten. Precedent in international courts: A network analysis of case citations by the European Court of Human Rights. *British Journal of Political Science*, 42:413–439, 3 2012

Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore. The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. *International Organization*, 53(4):699–732, 1999, note only some pages: pp. 715-732

Susan D. Hyde. Catch us if you can: Election monitoring and international norm diffusion. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2):356–69, 2011

Thomas Risse. Let's argue!: Communicative action in world politics. *International Organization*, 54(01):1–39, 2000, note only those pages to read: pp. 19-39

Liesbet Hooghe. Several roads lead to international norms, but few via international socialization: a case study of the european commission. *International Organization*, 59(04):861–898, 2005