

International Cooperation INTS 401a

Fall 2010

Time: Monday 3.30 - 5.20 pm

Location: RKZ 02

Instructor: Nikolay Marinov

e-mail: nikolay.marinov@yale.edu

Office Location: Rosenkranz Hall 407

Office Hours: Tuesday 1.30 pm - 3 pm

• **Course Description:**

International relations are often said to be in a state of ‘anarchy’, understood as a state or system in which no central authority exists to enforce contracts and implement order. The question we will pose is: how can order, cooperation, and peace emerge under conditions of anarchy? We start the course by asking theoretical questions about the emergence of cooperation under anarchy. We continue by probing fundamental questions about the effects of institutions (formal and informal) on behavior, the construction of institutions, the durability and form of international organizations.

- **Requirements and Grading:** Grades for the course will be based on participation (25%), and a midterm (25%), final exams (25%), and draft research design (25 %) due at the conclusion of the course (end of finals week). Participation consists of class attendance, brief occasional assignments (policy position papers of 2 pages or less) for students to post on the classes server, completion of the readings, taking part in discussion. (Yes, participation does count - lack of discussion may lower your grade while active discussion may increase it.) Students can download the midterm from `classesv2⇒Resources` any time between noon on October 4th and noon on October 11th and should upload the completed essay(s) to their dropboxes no later than 3 hours after the chosen download time. Please name your midterm “studentlastname midterm international cooperation.” The same applies to the final, except that you will have 5 hours to turn it in and the window of opportunity for download is noon, December 9th to noon, December 18th. Both exams are closed book and will involve writing one or more short essays.

Course Outline and Syllabus

Week 1

What Is the Problem of International Cooperation?

Steven Krasner. Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables. In Stephen Krasner, editor, *International Regimes*, pages 1–22. Cornell, Ithaca, NY, 1983

Week 2

Chaos, Order, Authority and Efficiency in International Relations and Economic Markets

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 1-32 - in ed. Robert Stressler. *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*. Touchstone, New York, 1998

Hobbes, Leviathan (the blue Cambridge edition - find it online as a free Google book), pp. 86-200.

Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action, chapters 1 and 2, pp. 1-65.

George Akerlof. The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 3:488–500, 1970

Ronald H. Coase. The problem of social cost. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 3:1–44, 1960

Week 3

How Does Cooperation Emerge? The Economic Story

R. H. Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law (Chicago, 1990), Chapters. 1 and 2, pp. 1-56.

Avner Greif. *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade*. Cambridge, New York, 2006, pp. 1-123 (pp. 407-452 optional primer in Game Theory).

Robert Axelrod. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. Basic Books, New York, 1984, pp. 1-54.

Robert Keohane. *After Hegemony*. Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., 1984, pp. 5-135.

Week 4

International Institutions: Perspectives on Effectiveness and its Sources

Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons. Theories and empirical studies of international institutions. *International Organization*, 52(4):729–757, 1998

J. Mearsheimer. The false promise of international institutions. *International Security*, 19:5–49, 1995

George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom. Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? *International Organization*, 50(3):379–406, 1996

Michael Tomz. *Reputation and International Relations: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries*. Princeton, Princeton, NJ, 2007 (excerpts)

Week 5

Assessing IO's Effects

Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. *Econometric Analysis of Cross Sections and Panel Data*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2002, pp. 1-34 and 47-113.

James Fearon. Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science. *World Politics*, 43(2):169–195, 1991

Beth Simmons. International law and state behavior: Commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs. *American Political Science Review*, 94(4):819–835, 2000

Jana von Stein. Do treaties constrain or screen? selection bias and treaty compliance. *American Political Science Review*, 99:611, 2005

Erik Voeten. Do nationals in leadership positions affect cooperation with international organizations? evidence from the international criminal court using a regression discontinuity design. Mimeo, Georgetown University, 2010

Week 6 - MIDTERM DUE IN CLASS OR UPLOADED TO CLASSES V2 BEFORE CLASS

Negotiations, Bargaining and Regime Design

Robert D. Putnam. Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. *International Organization*, 42(3):427–460, 1988

Stephen Krasner. Global communications and national power: Life on the pareto frontier. *World Politics*, 43:336–366, 1991

Ronald B. Mitchell. Regime design matters: Intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance. *International Organization*, 48(3):425–458, 1994

Barbara Koremenos. Contracting around international uncertainty. *American Political Science Review*, 99:549–565, 2005

Week 7

The Global Trade Regime and Cooperation in Financial Affairs

Robert Keohane. *After Hegemony*. Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., 1984, pp. 136–216.

Judith Goldstein, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. How does the trade regime affect international trade? Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 28-31, 2003., 2003

Moonhawk Kim. 2006. Unequal Law: Procedural Costs of WTO Rules on Developing Countries. Mimeo. Stanford U.

James Vreeland. *The IMF and Economic Development*. Cambridge, New York, 2003 (excerpts)

Week 8

Cooperation in Human Rights

Oona Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?,” 111 Yale Law Journal 1935 (2002).

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Relations*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1998, Chapters 1 and 3.

James Vreeland. Cat selection: Why dictatorships enter into the united nations convention against torture. *International Organization*, 2007 (manuscript, see class website.)

Gary Jonathon Bass, *Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). Excerpts.

Week 9

The Environment

Peter Haas, "Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone." *International Organization* 46, 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 187-224.

Kal Raustiala. States, ngos, and international environmental institutions. *International Studies Quarterly*, 4:719–740, 1997

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Relations*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1998, Chapter 4.

Sheila M. Olstead and Robert N. Stavins, "An International Policy Architecture for the Post-Kyoto Era." *American Economic Association. Papers and Proceedings*, vol. 96, no. 2 (May 2006): 35-38.

Week 10

Sovereignty and Security

Stephen Krasner. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1999, excerpts.

Mark W. Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force," *International Organization* 55, 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 215-250

David Lake. *Escape from the state of nature: Authority and hierarchy in world politics*. *International Security*, 32:47–79, 2007

Kenneth A. Schultz. The politics of risking peace: Do hawks or doves deliver the olive branch? *International Organization*, 59(1):1–38, 2005

Week 11

Weak States, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Michael Lipson. The reincarnation of cocom: Explaining post-cold war export controls. *The Nonproliferation Review*, pages 33–51, 1999

Alexander Montgomery. Proliferation networks in theory and practice. In James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz, editors, *Globalization and WMD Proliferation: Terrorism, Transnational Networks, and International Security*, pages 28–39. Routledge, London, UK, 2008

Karthika Sasikumar and Christopher Way. Paper tiger or barrier to proliferation? what accessories reveal about npt effectiveness. Mimeo, Cornell University, 2007

Stephen Krasner. Troubled societies, outlaw states, and gradations of sovereignty. Manuscript, Stanford University, 2002

Week 12

Cooperation in Peace-Keeping, Combatting Terrorism and Concluding Remarks

James Fearon and David Laitin. Neotrusteeship and the problem of weak states. *International Security*, 28:5–43, 2004

Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton, Princeton, NJ, 2006, pp. 1-163.

Robert Keohane. Governance in a partially globalized world: Presidential address, american political science association, 2000. *American Political Science Review*, 95(1):1–13, 2001

FINAL EXAM DUE