

POLSCI 139: Economic Sanctions and the Diplomacy of Intervention

<http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/05W/polisci139-2>

Winter 2005

MWF 9:00 AM - 9:50 AM; Location: Bunche 1209B

Final Exam: Friday, March 18, 2005, from 11:30:00 AM to 2:30:00 PM

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Office Hours: Wednesday: 10:00 am - noon and by appointment

- **Course Description:** This course provides an introduction to the use of economic sanctions as an instrument for intervention in international affairs. We start out by covering major theories in the study of international relations, with an emphasis on how they help us understand economic coercion. These theories include realism, liberalism, linkage politics, constructivism and game theory. We proceed to introduce a theory of economic coercion. The main question of interest is: do sanctions work? We will review statistical studies of the effectiveness of sanctions, and we will hear what the critics have said. To resolve the controversy, we look at two sets of illustrations of how sanctions are used, and what they achieve. One is their track record in destabilizing the government leaders they target. The other is their ability to bring democracy to foreign countries. By the end of the course, all students can expect to be able to ask and answer in a defensible way questions such as: (1) Were sanctions against Iraq right or was the use of force preferable? (2) Did apartheid in South Africa end because of, or in spite of international economic sanctions? (3) Is more sanctions or more cooperation the right policy against North Korea? We will discuss the ethical and practical questions that arise when choosing to use sanctions, and the merits of alternative policies such as doing nothing or applying military force.

This is a novel course on a subject that is of great practical interest, and one we know surprisingly little about. Student participation in lectures is expected, as is familiarity with the readings. Attendance is critical because the lectures will be structured to build on, and not just restate, the readings. A copy of the reader will be available for

purchase on the first day of class. Many readings will be available online. One book is required and can be ordered from online sellers:

David Baldwin. *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton University, Princeton, 1985

- **Requirements and Grading:** Grades for the course will be based on participation (10%), midterm examination (30%) and a final examination (60%). Participation consists of class attendance, completion of the readings, active participation in discussion.

Course Outline and Syllabus

First Meeting: Friday, Jan. 7, Lecture #1

Introduction: What Are Sanctions and Why Care?

(Lecture Notes)

Week 1

Monday, Jan. 10, Lecture #2

Theories of International Politics: Realism and Neoliberalism

Stephen M. Walt. International relations: One world, many theories. *Foreign Policy*, 110:5–21, 1998. Available from: <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0015-7228%28199821%290%3A110%3C29%3AIR0WMT%3E2.O.CO%3B2-3>

Wednesday, Jan. 12, Lecture #3

Theories of International Politics: Constructivism and Rational Choice

James Fearon and Alexander Wendt. Rationalism v. constructivism: A skeptical view. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, editors, *Handbook of International Relations*, pages 52–72. Sage Publications, London, 2002.

Friday, Jan. 14, Lecture #4

Theories of International Politics: Linkage Politics

James Rosenau. *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems*. Free Press, New York, 1969, Pp. 1-17.

Week 2

Wednesday, Jan. 19, Lecture #5

Enter Economic Sanctions

David Baldwin. *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton University, Princeton, 1985. Pp. 1-50.

Friday, Jan. 21, Lecture #6

Some Game Theoretic Concepts Come to Our Aid: Actors, Strategies, Information, Bargaining, Signaling.

(Lectures notes)

Week 3

Monday, Jan. 24, Lecture #7

The Bargaining Approach to Sanctions

David Baldwin. *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton University, Princeton, 1985, Pp. 96-114.

R. Harrison Wagner. Economic interdependence, bargaining power and political influence. *International Organization*, 42(3):461–83, 1988 Available from: <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28198822%2942%3A3%3C461%3AEIBPAP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z>

Wednesday, Jan. 26, Lecture #8

Beyond Bargaining: The Many Uses of Economic Statecraft

David Baldwin. The sanctions debate and the logic of choice. *International Security*, 24(3):80–107, 1999. Available to UCLA people through IngentaSelect (you need to search by author, title and journal in <http://www.ingentaselect.com/>.)

Friday, Jan. 28, Lecture #9

Contra and For Sanctions: Sovereignty and All That

David Baldwin. *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton University, Princeton, 1985. Pp. 336-369.

Week 4

Monday, Jan. 31, Lecture #10

Do Sanctions Work? HSE's Statistical Approach

Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey Shott, and Ann Elliott. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 1990, Pp. 1-47.

Wednesday, Feb. 2, Lecture #11

More on HSE's database

Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey Shott, and Ann Elliott. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 1990, Pp. 48-89.

Friday, Feb. 4, Lecture #12

HSE's Conclusions: A Modest Success

Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey Shott, and Ann Elliott. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 1990, Pp. 91-115.

Week 5

Monday, Feb. 7, Lecture #13

The Big Criticism: Brute Force, not Sanctions

Robert Pape. Why economic sanctions do not work. *International Security*, 22(2):90–136, 1997. Available from: <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28199723%2922%3A2%3C90%3AWESDNW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X>

Wednesday, Feb. 9, Lecture #14

Criticism 2: Success is All About Domestic Politics in the United States

Michael Hiscox. The political economy of economic sanctions. Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 2000, August 2000. Available from class website (see list of links).

Friday, Feb. 11, Lecture #15

Criticisms Galore: They Just Don't Work

David Baldwin. *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton University, Princeton, 1985. Pp. 115-144.

Week 6

Monday, Feb. 14, Lecture #16

One Response: Do Sanctions Get Government Leaders Out of Office?

Nicholas Kristoff, Op-Ed in New York Times. *Our Man in Havana*. November 8, 2003.

Marinov, Nikolay. 2005. *Does Pressure from the Outside Destabilize Leaders on the Inside?*
Available from class website (see list of links).

Wednesday, Feb. 16, Lecture #17

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Friday, Feb. 18, Lecture #18

What You See Is Not What You Get: Observability and Success

Daniel W. Drezner. The hidden hand of economic coercion. *International Organization*,
57(3):643–659, 2003. Available from class website (see list of links).

Week 7

Wednesday, Feb. 23, Lecture #19

International Organizations: Organized Coercion

Daniel Drezner. Bargaining, enforcement, and multilateral sanctions: When is cooperation counterproductive? *International Organization*, 54(1):73–102, Winter 2000. Available online for UCLA people from Cambridge Online Journals.

Friday, Feb. 25, Lecture #20

Sanctions as Containment

Gunnar Adler-Karlsson. *Western Economic Warfare: A Case-Study in Foreign Economic Policy*. Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm, 1968. Pp. 1-12.

Robert Litwak. *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War*. Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., 2000, Pp. 157-197

Week 8

Monday, Feb. 28, Lecture #21

Why Is Democracy Spreading?

Larry Diamond. Universal democracy? *Policy Review*, 119, 2004. Available from: <http://www.policyreview.org/jun03/diamond.html>

Wednesday, March 2, Lecture #22

The European Union as a Promoter of Democracy

Milada Vachudova. The leverage of international institutions on democratizing states: Eastern Europe and the European Union. Robert Shuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, Italy, 2001. EUI Working Paper. Available from class website.

Friday, March 4, Lecture #23

A Test of “Do Sanctions Help Democracy?”

Marinov, Nikolay. 2004. *Foreign Pressure and the Domestic Political Foundations of Democracy*. Available from the class website. h

Week 9

Monday, March 7, Lecture #24

Foreign Aid As an Instrument for Influence: Is Aid About Development?

Alberto Alesina and David Dollar. Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5:33–63, 2000. Available from the class website.

Wednesday, March 9, Lecture #25

If Not About Development, What is Aid About?

Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor. Clarifying the foreign aid puzzle: A comparison of american, japanese, french, and swedish aid flows. *World Politics*, 50(2):294–323, 1998. Available from the UCLA Library (search journal title under: Search and Find — E-Resources—E-Journals).

Friday, March 11, Lecture #26

Current Issues in Intervention: Humanitarian Disasters

Martha Finnemore. *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force*. Cornell University, Ithaca and London, 2003. Pp. 85-140.

Week 10

Monday, March 14, Lecture #27

Intervention as State Building: A Post-Modern Imperialism

James Fearon and David Laitin. Postmodern imperialism. *International Security*, 2004. Available from class website.

Wednesday, March 16, Lecture #28

Review: Whither Sanctions?

(Lecture Notes)

FINAL EXAM:

Friday, March 18, 2005, from 11:30:00 AM to 2:30:00 PM