

# **The Politics of Influence: Foreign Aid and Economic Sanctions In International Relations**

International Policy Studies Program/IR  
Stanford University

<http://www.stanford.edu/class/ips216/>

## Syllabus

Instructor: Nikolay V. Marinov

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This course will examine how state leaders have used economic coercion to convince other state actors to comply with a set of demands. Economic statecraft covers a wide variety of policy options “between words and war”: stronger than diplomatic suasion, yet less objectionable than the use of force.

Emphasis will be placed on understanding the conceptual and methodological issues involved in measuring the uses and outcomes of interstate coercion.

The main thrust of the course will be very much applied. A substantial portion of our attention will be turned to specific policy areas in which there is a high demand for intervention currently. These are (1) democratization and regime change, (2) stopping and preventing civil wars, (3) containing rogue states, (4) protecting intellectual property rights and (5) defending system of free trade around the world.

The course will be taught in seminar format.

### **Assignments:**

Students will be asked to write two short memos (2 pages) critiquing aspects of our understanding of the problem of intervention. The topics of the critical memos will be assigned one week before their due dates. The main assignment for the course will be a research paper proposal (limit 5 pages), leading to a research paper (20 pages). See the time-line below for due dates. \*Format of the submissions: double-spaced, 12-pt font, with a bibliography appearing in the end. All assignments will be due at start of class on their due date.

### **Grading:**

20 % in-class participation, 20 % for the two critical memos, 20 % for the research proposal, 40 % final paper.

**Required texts available at the Bookstore\***

Badwin, David. *Economic Statecraft*.

Schelling, Thomas. *The Strategy of Conflict*.

\*Note: All other reading materials will be available online through the course website

**Course Timeline:**

Wed, April 2

Introduction

(no reading)

Between Words and Wars: A Brief History, The Theory of Sanctions and the Current Conventional Wisdom

Mon, April 7

Beeston, Richard, "Mugabe faces new sanction after snub to leaders", *The Times of London*, Sept. 23, 2002.

Wallensteen, Peter. 2000. "A Century of Economic Sanctions: A Field Revisited". Uppsala Peace Research Papers No. 1.

Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*.

Wed, April 9

Baldwin, David. 2000. "Success and Failure in Foreign Policy", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3:167-82.

Schelling, Thomas. "The Diplomacy of Violence" in *Arms and Influence* (1966).

Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*.

Recommended:

Hirschman, Albert. 1945. *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. Berkeley, California: University of California.

Mon, April 14

Hufbauer, Gary C., Jeffrey Shott and Ann Elliott. 1990. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics. pp. 1-122.

Dashti-Gibson, Jaleh, Patricia Davis and Benjamin Radcliff. 1997. "On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 41:608-618.

Recommended:

Elliott, Kimberly and Peter Uimonen. 1993. "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions with Application to the Case of Iraq." *Japan and the World Economy* 5:403-409.

Wed, April 16 (short memo #1 due)

Lindsay, James M. 1986. "Trade Sanctions As Policy Instruments: A Re-Examination." *International Studies Quarterly* 30:153-173.

Pape, Robert. 1997. "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work." *International Security* 22:90-136.

Recommended:

Galtung, Johan. 1967. "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia." *World Politics* 19:378-416.

Rowe, David. 2001. *Manipulating the Market: Understanding Economic Sanctions, Institutional Change, and the Political Unity of White Rhodesia*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan.

Mon, April 21

Focus on Policy Issues:

Democracy and Regime Change

Hanlon, Joseph. 1990. "Successes and Future Prospects of Sanctions against South Africa" *Review of African Political Economy*, 47:84-96.

Levy, PI. 1999. "Sanctions on South Africa: What did They Do?", in *American Economic Review*, vol.89, no. 2.

Gleijeses, Piero. 1983. "The Case for Power Sharing in El-Salvador". *Foreign Affairs* 61:1048-1063.

Tomasevski, Katarina. 2000. "Donor's Reorientation to Democracy" in *Between Sanctions and Elections: Aid Donors and Their Human Rights Performance*. pp. 157-181.

Recommended:

McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2000. "Trust and Cooperation through Agent-specific Punishments." *International Organization* 54:809-24.

Wed, April 23

Focus on Policy Issues:

Civil Wars

McHugh. 2001. "US Aid and Ethnic Conflict: An Epiphany?" in: Esman and Herring, *Carrots, Sticks and Ethnic Conflict: Rethinking Development Assistance*, pp. 49-89

Regan, Patrick. 2000. *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict*. pp. 19-35 and pp. 65-99.

Mon, April 28

Focus on Policy Issues:

Aggressive Unilateralism in U.S. Trade Policy

Alan O. Sykes. 1992. "Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: the Limited Case for Section 301". *Law and Policy in International Business* 23: 263-330.

Bayard, Thomas, and Kimberly Ann Elliott. 1994. *Reciprocity and Retaliation in U.S. Trade Policy*. Washington: Institute for International Economics. pp. 51-97.

Wed, April 30

Focus on Policy Issues:

Intellectual Property Rights & Other Matters

Benedikte Callan. 1998. *Pirates on the High Seas: The United States and Global Intellectual Property Rights*. Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC.

Susan K. Sell. 1995. "Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing World: Crisis, Coercion, and Choice". *International Organization* 49: 315-349.

Leonard J. Schoppa. 1999. "The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining". *International Organization* 53, 2, Spring 1999, pp. 307-342.

Daniel W. Drezner. 2002. "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion." Manuscript. Department of Political Science, University of Chicago.

Sanctions and International Organizations

Mon, May 5 (research proposal due)

Drezner, Daniel. 2000. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When is Cooperation Counterproductive?" *International Organization* 54:73-102.

Lisa L. Martin. 1992. Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict. *International Security*, 16:143-178.

Michael Lipson. 2001. "Organizational Fields and International Regimes." Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics, Working Paper Series #01-03. University of Pennsylvania.

Wed, May 7

Case Study in International Organizations: the UN system of sanctions

Kortright, David and George Lopez. 2002. "Sanctions and Regional Security: The Crisis in West Africa." In: *Sanctions and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner

Slavi Tr. Slavov. 2002. "Is It All About Sanctions Busting: The Effects of UN Sanctions on Neighbor Countries." Manuscript. Department of Economics, Stanford University.

Stephanides, J. "A Brief Overview of United Nations Applied Sanctions". *Proceedings from the 1st Interlaken Seminar on Targeting UN Financial Sanctions*, March 17-19, 1998 (<http://www.smartsanctions.ch/>).

Sanctions and the Use of Force: Embargoes, Containment and Rogue States

Mon, May 12

Allen Cheng, "The United States of China: How business is moving Taipei and Beijing together", July 6, 2001. *Asiaweek.com*.

Kennan, George. 1947. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs* 25:567-582.

Adler-Karlsson, Gunnar. 1968. *Western Economic Warfare: A Case-Study in Foreign Economic Policy*. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell. pp. 1-12.

Liberman, Peter. 1996. "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains." *International Security* 21:147-175.

Wed, May 14

Litwak, Robert. 2000. "US Strategy toward Rogue States." In: *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center. pp. 47-119.

Litwak, Robert. 2000. "Iraq" In: *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment*. pp. 159-197.

Litwak, Robert. 2000. "Iran: A Revolutionary State Or Ready to Rejoin the Family of Nations?" In: *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment*. pp. 159-197.

Recommended:

Drezner, Daniel. 2000. *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University.

### Foreign Aid as an Instrument for Influence

Mon, May 19 (short memo #2 due)

Alesina, Alberto and David Dollar. 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" *Journal of Economic Growth* 5:33-63.

Wang, T. Y. 1999. U.S. Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis of Important Issues. *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1):199-210.

Wed, May 21

Collier, Paul, and David Dollar. 1999. "Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction." World Bank, Development Research Group, Washington, D.C.

Tomasevski, Katarina. 2000. *Between Sanctions and Elections: Aid Donors and Their Human Rights Performance*. Chapters 2-4. pp. 17-95.

Cohen, Stephen B. 1982. "Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices." *American Journal of International Law* 76:246-279.

Recommended:

Sislin, John. 1994. "Arms as Influence: The Determinants of Successful Influence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38(4): 665-689.

### The Current Agenda: Terror, Arms and Diamonds

Wed, May 28

Anthony, Ian and Jean Pascal Zanders. 1998. "Multilateral Security-Related Export Controls." In *SIPRI Yearbook 1998: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security*, 373-402. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kortright, David and George Lopez. 2002. "Carrots and Sticks for Controlling Terrorism." In *Sanctions and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner

Mon, June 2

Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano and Mikael Eriksson, eds. 2003. *Making Targeted Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for the Implementation of UN Policy Options*. Results from the

Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions. Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

Kortright, David and George Lopez. 2002. "Reform or Retreat: The Future of UN Sanctions Policy." In: *Sanctions and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner

Wed, June 4

Wrap-up: Do Sanctions Work, or What Do We Know about This?

Reading TBA

Mon, June 9 (no class; research paper due)

**Beyond this class: Want to know more?**

*The Stockholm Process on Smart Sanctions*

Includes the most comprehensive and up-to-date sanctions bibliography one could think of. Also, a ton of links to UN sanctions missions, weapons control regimes, trade-related think-tanks like the Institute of International Economics in DC, all on the frontiers of current sanctions applications and research.

<http://www.smartsanctions.se/index.htm>